? E XERCISE 212.1 (Electoral competition with strategic voters) Assume that there are n ≥ 3…

?  EXERCISE  212.1 (Electoral competition with strategic voters)  Assume that    there

 

are n  ≥ 3 candidates and q citizens, where q  ≥ 2n is odd (so that the median   of

the voters’ favorite positions is well-defined) and divisible by n. Show that the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which no citizen’s strategy is weakly dominated and every candidate enters the race and chooses the median of the citizens’ favorite positions. (You may use the fact that every voting subgame has a (pure) Nash equilibrium in which no citizen’s action is weakly dominated.)

 

 

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